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INTRODUCTION
“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .”1 The
Constitution so introduces the prerogative of the House and Senate to govern
their own conduct—but it lays out no guidelines for how the chambers
should construct these rules.2 The Senate’s system of self-governance has
become so complex that it requires a full-time parliamentarian to prepare
written guidance for Senators and convey advice to the presiding officer on
the appropriate rulings in session.3 In spite of (or perhaps because of) this
complexity, many of the Senate’s rules are not codified, and the most recent
compilation of the Senate’s informal precedent was published in 1992, with
only smaller collections published electronically since.4 The question, then,
is whether the proliferation of unwritten rules and precedents has an effect
on the ability of the Senate to exercise its lawmaking authority.
Former Senate Parliamentarian Floyd Riddick described the chamber’s
procedure as “a maze that nobody can run through unless you study.” 5
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.2.
The primary limitations on Congress’s self-governance are that the rules of the chambers must not
“ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights” and that “there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding . . . and the result which is sought
to be attained.” United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20544, THE OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN
IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 1 (2018).
Id.
Interview by Donald A. Ritchie with Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian (July 12, 1978).
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Decidedly, Senate procedure is intricate, and the day-to-day function is
governed by a mix of Standing Rules, statutory rules, constitutional
requirements, standing orders, and informal precedent.6 Among these, the
precedents take the largest role. Senators generally adhere to the unwritten
rules, but because they are not binding, they can be bent and broken.7 This
“procedural looseness” is one of the reasons that the Senate’s actions are
“especially vulnerable” to obstruction.8
The Senate’s constitutional abilities and duties are expansive, but those
relating to the confirmation process are not clearly defined.9 The chamber’s
responsibilities relating to judicial confirmations are sparely described as
“Advice and Consent,” 10 and the form of that process has changed
significantly over the years. 11 To accommodate for the dearth of formal
requirements, the Senate and the Executive “developed informal
accommodations or arrangements . . . with respect to judicial
appointments.” 12 The outcome of the judicial nomination process thus
depends in no small part upon the exercise of these unwritten rules.13
Unwritten rules aren’t unique to Congress, and cannot uniformly be
described as useful or harmful. Baseball, for instance, is famed for its
unwritten rules. Some of them are substantive, and dictate good strategy (for
instance, runners are expected not to make the first out of an inning at third
base).14 Others are matters of courtesy or deference and shouldn’t affect the
outcome of a game at all (such as the idea that players shouldn’t drive up the
score when ahead by a substantial margin). 15 Some are matters of pure
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James Wallner, A Beginner’s Guide to the Senate’s Rules 1, R Street Policy (Sept. 2017).
Keith Krehbiel, Unanimous Consent Agreements: Going Along in the Senate, 48 J. POL. 541, 542 (1986).
John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2191 (2013).
Nat’l Const. Ctr. Staff, The Constitution and the Cabinet Nomination Process, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb.
2, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-constitution-and-the-cabinet-nominationprocess [https://perma.cc/K89C-5YLL].
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1730–38 (2015)
(summarizing the evolution of the Advice and Consent process).
Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 669 (2003).
Id. at 670.
Anthony Castrovince, A Look at Baseball’s ‘Unwritten Rule Book’, MLB (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://www.mlb.com/news/the-unwritten-rules-of-baseball [https://perma.cc/9LJZ-6JKJ].
Id. (outlining the unwritten rules of baseball); see George F. Will, In Baseball, the Most Valuable Rules
Are
Unwritten,
SALT
LAKE
TRIB.
(Oct.
30,
2019,
3:17
PM),
https://www.sltrib.com/opinion/commentary/2019/10/30/george-f-will-baseball/
[https://perma.cc/D855-9QMR] (arguing for the importance of baseball’s rules of courtesy).
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tradition or superstition (as with the admonition that no one—spectator,
player, or announcer alike—should speak of a perfect game while it is in
progress).16 These same categories apply to the Senate’s unwritten rules as
well.
Just as in baseball, some of the Senate’s unwritten rules have no effect on
the substance of lawmaking. For many years, Senate tradition dictated that
women should not wear pants on the chamber floor.17 This unwritten rule
was plainly unrelated to legislation—and sexist to boot—but it lasted until
the Clinton presidency.18 Other unwritten rules and traditions are equally
tangential to the actual business of the Senate, but have persisted for
decades—the requirement that the Senate cafeteria shall always serve bean
soup, 19 for instance, or the senators’ springtime tradition of Seersucker
Thursdays.20 These longstanding requirements and rituals are simply part
of the Senate atmosphere, and have evolved out of years of practice.
Not all of the Senate’s unwritten rules are so tangential, nor so easy to
define. One unwritten rule that has recently gone by the wayside was the
tradition that newly elected senators should not speak for weeks—or months,
or even years—after their installment, out of deference to senior members
and respect for the “apprenticeship” that freshmen were expected to serve.21
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See, e.g., Dan Tylicki, Baseball’s 25 Biggest Unwritten Rules, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 17, 2012),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1146901-baseballs-25-biggest-unwritten-rules
[https://perma.cc/FE9G-N5CH] (“When a pitcher is five-plus innings into a no-hitter or perfect
game, then it’s common courtesy not to mention it. If you do, it’ll end up jinxing it especially if
you’re a teammate.”). A “perfect game” occurs in baseball when a pitcher allows no opposing
batters to reach base, retiring every batter in the order that they take the plate. MLB Miscellany:
Rules,
Regulations,
and
Statistics,
MLB.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/about_mlb/rules_regulations.jsp
[https://perma.cc/SG6C-D2H3] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
See Trisha Leigh Zeigenhorn, The Woman Who Finally Wore Pants onto the Senate Floor – in 1993, DID
YOU KNOW?, https://didyouknowfacts.com/the-woman-who-finally-wore-pants-onto-the-senatefloor-in-1993/ [https://perma.cc/2Z8X-A9Y2] (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (discussing the unwritten
rule that women in the Senate could not wear pants).
Id.
Richard A. Baker, TRADITIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 6.
Id. at 13.
See Donald R. Matthews, The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative
Effectiveness, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1064, 1065 (1959) (“[N]ew members are expected to serve an
unobtrusive apprenticeship.”); Baker, supra note 19, at 9 (“From the Senate’s earliest days, new
members have observed a ritual of remaining silent during floor debates for a period of time—
depending on the era and the senator. That period once ranged from several months to several
years.”).
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This policy was observed for “most of the Senate’s existence” but has been
largely abandoned since the advent of the 24-hour news cycle because “the
electorate wouldn’t stand for it.”22 Other unwritten rules include the Senate
precedents governing recognition in the chamber and the amendment
process, and the tradition of “trading votes” to pass legislation.23
Two of the most prominent sets of unwritten rules in the Senate relate to
the confirmation processes for federal officers and the judiciary—thus
implicating two or even three branches of government rather than just one.
The first of these is the unwritten rule of Senatorial Courtesy, under which
the Senate defers to a senator who objects to a nominee for federal office in
her home state. 24 The related practice of sending out “blue slips” in the
Judiciary Committee to gauge home-state senators’ support is also not
subject to a formal rule. 25 The second unwritten rule affecting multiple
branches is a practice—often called the Thurmond Rule—under which
nominees for federal courts may or may not be considered after an
indeterminate point in the Presidential election cycle.26 The effect of these
rules is significant, as they pertain not only to the Senate’s constitutional
duties, but to the Executive and the Judiciary’s duties as well.27
In Part I, I summarize the historical practices of senatorial courtesy, blueslipping, and the so-called Thurmond Rule. In Part II, I examine the effects
of adherence to, and departure from, these unwritten rules. In particular,
the examination focuses on the political consequences faced by senators and
22

23
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26
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Baker, supra note 19, at 9. The once-ubiquitous practice of quiet “apprenticeship” has more
recently been observed to varying degrees by individual senators, with some freshmen becoming
high-profile and vocal while others “mov[e] into hunker-down mode” after being sworn in. Carl
Hulse, New Senators’ Goals May Be Shaped by Their Styles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/us/politics/26senate.html [https://perma.cc/9YGCWCD4].
Wallner, supra note 6.
Oscar S. Cox, Senatorial Courtesy, 1 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 88, 88 (2013).
MICHAEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21674, THE BLUE-SLIP PROCESS IN THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY: BACKGROUND, ISSUES, AND OPINIONS 2 (2003).
Carl Tobias, Transforming the “Thurmond Rule” in 2016, 66 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2001 (2016);
see Mary Kay Linge, McConnell Dismisses “Biden Rule” for SCOTUS Nominee as GOP Controls Senate, WH,
N.Y. POST (Sept. 19, 2020, 6:07 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/09/19/mitch-mcconnelldismisses-biden-rule-for-scotus-nominee/ [https://perma.cc/HE26-B2BQ] (referring to the rule
as the “Biden Rule” in the context of a Supreme Court nomination).
Because the Executive has the duty of nomination, the role of the President in this process is
significant. No less is the effect on the Judiciary, because the composition of that branch is directly
affected by the process’s outcome—if the Senate rejects or fails to consider a nominee, that nominee
cannot take the bench (setting aside the possibility of recess appointment).
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the practical effects of the rules on lawmaking. Part III addresses the question
of whether the continued existence of these unwritten rules is desirable, in
light of the constitutional duties and practical needs of the Senate. I conclude
that the proliferation of unwritten rules creates too many questions and
complications to be encouraged. Finally, Part IV summarizes the options
available to address these unwritten rules. I explain why judicial intervention
is possible but unlikely, and address two different methods of legislative
reform—codification and abrogation.
I. THE HISTORY OF UNWRITTEN RULES
A. Senatorial Courtesy and the “Blue Slip” Process
One of the oldest of the Senate’s informal rules is senatorial courtesy.
Senatorial courtesy is a longstanding tradition that has persisted from the first
Congress through to the present day.28 The tradition is more than the mere
nicety its name suggests. It is not a set of rules for politeness observed on the
Senate floor, but rather a means by which, through unilateral objection, a
Senator may scuttle the nomination of a certain person to federal office.29
While most often applied to appointments in the objecting senator’s home
state, the reach of senatorial courtesy has at times been broader.30
The custom can be traced to the 1789 nomination of Benjamin
Fishbourn by President Washington for a naval post in Savannah, Georgia,
which was opposed on the grounds of “nothing of consequence but personal
invective and abuse” by James Gunn, one of Georgia’s senators.31 However
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See, e.g., Charlene Bickford, Setting Precedent: The First Senate and President Washington Struggle to Define
“Advice and Consent,” 7 FED. HIST. 1, 6 (2015) (tracing senatorial courtesy to 1789); “Personally
Obnoxious”?: Senatorial “Courtesy” and Judicial Nominations, 33 A.B.A. J. 805, 805 (1947) (addressing
questions about the application of senatorial courtesy in 1947); Cox, supra note 24 (addressing
questions about the application of senatorial courtesy in 2013).
Cox, supra note 24, at 88.
See Jason Eric Sharp, Restoring the Constitutional Formula to the Federal Judicial Appointment Process: Taking
the Vice out of “Advice and Consent,” 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 747 (2004) (noting that the role
of senatorial courtesy is sometimes considered to extend beyond home-state offices such as the
District Courts). As I will address in later sections, the exact contours of senatorial courtesy are not
agreed upon.
Bickford, supra note 28, at 10. Fishbourn had replaced Ruben Wilkinson in the role, and Wilkinson
intended to request reappointment with the support of Sen. Gunn, in whose election Wilkinson had
been instrumental. Id. at 7. After attempts to “avoid or conceal” an outright objection to
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flimsy the grounds, they were sufficient to defeat the nomination, and the
incident is cited as the origin of senatorial courtesy. 32 The rejection of
Fishbourn set a precedent that remains in effect—that the entire Senate
would, on occasion, accede to a single senator’s objection in rejecting a
nominee.33
Because the rule is unwritten, 34 the exact limits of the power held by
senatorial courtesy are not clearly defined. 35 Generally, the rule applies
where “a President nominates someone for a federal office within a state,
without consulting the senator or senators of the President’s party from that
state,” and, if honored, results in rejection of the nominee at a home-state
senator’s request.36 The form of the objection is no more developed now
than it was when Senator Gunn objected in 1789—traditionally the homestate senator who wishes to defeat a nomination need only state that the
nominee is “personally obnoxious” to her.37 Senators disagree as to whether
further grounds are necessary, 38 but generally concur that the home-state
senators’ preferences should be honored with regard to local offices.39 This
is not to say that the objection will always be honored, even for such offices,
because the informal nature of the rule allows the Senate to proceed over an
objection.40

32
33
34
35

36
37
38
39
40

Fishbourn’s nomination, Gunn rose to make an objection on the floor which was described later as
“false, [m]alignant, and invidious” and “an illiberal attack upon [Fishbourn’s] [c]haracter.” Id. at
7, 11.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
See Cox, supra note 24, at 88 (2013) (“The custom known as ‘senatorial courtesy’ is not a formal rule
of the Senate, and is not included in the published rules of that body.”).
Compare id. at 91 (noting that “most, if not all” instances where a nominee to the Supreme Court
was objected to under senatorial courtesy were rejected “based on considerations independent of
the objection so raised”), with Sharp, supra note 30, at 756 (“Although primarily a tool for the
consideration of nominations of district judges, the practice of senatorial courtesy accounts, at least
partially, for the rejection of several nominations to the Supreme Court.”).
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 9.7(b)(iii) (2012).
BETSY PALMER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31948, EVOLUTION OF THE SENATE’S ROLE IN THE
NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 7 (2008).
Id.; see also “Personally Obnoxious”?: Senatorial “Courtesy” and Judicial Nominations, supra note 28, at 806
(debating whether the “personally obnoxious” objection should be honored).
Cox, supra note 24, at 88.
See PALMER, supra note 37, at 8 (referencing a 1938 case in which a nominee was confirmed over
the home-state senator’s objection); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 36, at § 9.7(b)(iii) n.17
(“[O]ther senators have refused to extend the courtesy to a senator who ‘had on numerous
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Closely tied to senatorial courtesy is the “blue slip” process, which is
limited to judicial nominees. “Blue-slipping” is a Judiciary Committee
procedure “along the same lines” as senatorial courtesy. 41 The Judiciary
Chair “seeks the assessment of nominees from home-state Senators” by
issuing a blue sheet of paper, which may be returned with a positive or
negative recommendation, or withheld entirely.42 The process is subject to
alteration in every new Congress, because the Judiciary Chair has “discretion
to change the policy when deemed necessary.”43 The chairperson has total
control over the blue slip’s effect, and determines how much weight a
senator’s recommendation will be given.44 As with the broader custom of
senatorial courtesy, the blue slip process “is not a formal part of the Judiciary
Committee’s rules.”45 If the chair chooses to adhere to the usual blue slip
policy, she will generally table the nomination “rather than allowing the
nomination to proceed to a full Senate vote likely to fail.”46 In essence, the
Judiciary Committee’s blue slip process serves to predict whether senatorial
courtesy will be exercised, and to kill the nomination at the committee stage
if that is the case.
B. The “Thurmond Rule”
While senatorial courtesy has a long tradition of practice in the Senate,
the so-called Thurmond Rule is a far more recent development.47 The Rule,
which is often traced to Strom Thurmond’s leadership in the Judiciary
Committee, holds that the Senate should stop its confirmation process for
judicial nominations at some point in presidential election years. 48 Of
course, the Thurmond Rule is not a “rule” at all, in the colloquial sense; it is

41
42
43
44
45
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48

occasions shown marked discourtesy to his colleagues.’” (quoting J. Harris, THE ADVICE AND
CONSENT OF THE SENATE, 224–25 (1953))).
supra note 37, at 4. Essentially, just as with senatorial courtesy, blue-slips can prevent the
confirmation of a judicial nominee based on the objection of a single senator.
SOLLENBERGER, supra note 25, at 1. Blue-slipping evolved out of senatorial courtesy, and has been
referred to as an “institutionalized” form of the practice. Id. at 3.
Id. at 13.
PALMER, supra note 37, at 9.
Id.
Sharp, supra note 30, at 755.
See Tobias, supra note 26, at 2002 (dating the Thurmond Rule to 1980).
Russell Wheeler, The “Thurmond Rule” and Other Advice and Consent Myths, BROOKINGS INST. (May
25, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25/the-thurmond-rule-and-otheradvice-and-consent-myths/ [https://perma.cc/TT8Z-B2T6].
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a “peculiar tradition—not a statute or even a powerful dictate, like Senate
rules, which bind members.”49 While it has been invoked several times since
its 1980s origin, 50 there is no consensus on the Rule’s existence, 51
application,52 or even its name.53
The Thurmond Rule is not selective in the way that senatorial courtesy
and the blue slip process are. While senatorial courtesy allows individual
senators to block individual nominees, the Thurmond Rule allows the
Judiciary Chair to block all nominees at a time that he or she sees fit during
the election year.54 Some “consensus” nominees may be excepted from the
Rule, but generally the Rule is taken to apply to all lifetime appointments.55
The Thurmond Rule normally sees use in two scenarios. First, when the
majority in the Senate does not control the White House and refuses to
advance nominees based on the possibility that its party may win the
presidency.56 Second, when the majority party does control the White House

49
50

51

52

53

54
55

56

Tobias, supra note 26, at 2001.
See, e.g., Martin Schram, Dems, GOP Reverse Roles on Court Picks, BOSTON HERALD (Nov. 18, 2018,
12:00 AM), https://www.bostonherald.com/2016/02/19/schram-dems-gop-reverse-roles-oncourt-picks [https://perma.cc/E64M-62DA] (explaining the rule’s invocation and opposition in
2008 and 2016); Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., to George
W. Bush, President of the United States (Mar. 20, 2008) (invoking the Rule in 2008).
See Mitch McConnell, Protecting American Justice: Ensuring Confirmation of Qualified Judicial Nominees,
Remarks Before the Senate Republican Conference, C-SPAN, at 01:07:15 (July 14, 2008),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?206379-1/judicial-confirmation-process&start=1832 (“[T]here
is no Thurmond Rule.”).
See DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS & KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34615, NOMINATION
AND CONFIRMATION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS
36 (2008) (observing that the date of the final judicial confirmation has not been consistent among
the presidential election years since the Thurmond Rule was announced).
The “Thurmond Rule” has been referred to by at least three different names, including the
McConnell Rule and the Biden Rule. See Linge, supra note 26 (referring to the Rule as the “Biden
Rule” in the context of a Supreme Court nomination); see also Gary Martin, McConnell Rule? Biden
Rule? The Politics Behind This Supreme Court Pick, LAS VEGAS REV.–J. (Sept. 26, 2020, 7:21 AM),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/mcconnell-rule-biden-rule-thepolitics-behind-this-supreme-court-pick-2130400 [https://perma.cc/6K5L-KDA6] (referring to
the Rule alternatively as the Biden Rule or the McConnell Rule).
See Earle, supra note 68 (discussing the Judiciary Committee’s role in exercising the Rule).
RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra note 52, at 9–10 (“Over time, Senator Thurmond and Republican leaders
refined their use and practices under the rule to prevent the consideration of lifetime judicial
appointments in the last year of a Presidency [unless the nominees under consideration were]
consensus nominees.”(quoting 108 CONG. REC. 16,974 (2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy))).
RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra note 52, at 9–10 (explaining that Senator Patrick Leahy invoked the
Thurmond Rule when the Democratic Party controlled the Senate and President George W. Bush
was in the White House).
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and the minority party demands that it cease confirmations, purportedly so
that the electorate may have a say in the filling of those vacancies.57
II. THE EFFECTS OF ADHERENCE AND DEPARTURE
While the rules discussed here are unwritten, they are not
inconsequential. Unwritten rules have both political and practical effects.
The political effects, as discussed here, are those imposed by others in the
system to punish defection or encourage adherence to the rules. The
practical effects—such as confusion, uncertainty, or delay—are those that
the enforcement of the rules themselves create, often by nature of being
unwritten.
It is helpful to revisit the unwritten rules of baseball to demonstrate the
distinction.
Many of baseball’s unwritten rules have “political”
consequences. Sometimes rules will be enforced by criticism to the media or
a scolding from the team manager.58 Other times, the enforcement may be
physical—players are known, or even expected, to retaliate for rule breaking
with “vigilante ramifications” like hitting violators with pitches or initiating
brawls with the opposing team. 59 These both fall into the category of
“political” effects—the politics of the system being played out by its members.
On the other hand, the fact that baseball has so many unwritten rules has
led to practical effects as well. Players don’t always know which rules will be
enforced; the rules that a veteran holds sacred may be unknown to a rookie,
and players from different backgrounds have different concepts of violations

57
58

59

See id. (noting that Senator Strom Thurmond’s request to stop confirmations came when the
Republican Party was in the minority and President Jimmy Carter was in office).
See
Greg
Kristan,
Unwritten
Rules
in
Baseball,
STADIUM
REVS.,
https://thestadiumreviews.com/resources/unwritten-rules-in-baseball/
[https://perma.cc/AS5X-2C6N] (noting the threat of a “talking to by the manager” for a rookie
who breaks the unwritten rules of pitching etiquette); Katherine Acquavella, Fernando Tatis Jr.’s
Grand Slam on 3-0 Count Angers Rangers and Sparks Talk over Baseball’s Unwritten Rules, CBS SPORTS
(Aug. 19, 2020, 11:34 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/Fernando-tatis-jr-s-grandslam-on-3-0-count-angers-rangers-and-sparks-talk-over-baseballs-unwritten-rules/
[https://perma.cc/V2UT-SH92] (discussing an instance in which both the opposing manager and
a player’s own manager criticized the violation of an unwritten rule to reporters).
See Tim Kurkjian, The Unwritten Canon, Revealed, ESPN, http://espn.com/espn/print?id=10964445
[https://perma.cc/R9UP-N92Y] (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (describing “drilling” and brawling as
enduring punishments for violation of baseball’s unwritten rules). Kurkjian puts the consequences
of rule breaking bluntly: “If you disrespect [a player], their team or the game, you will pay, often
with something in the ribs at 90 mph.” Id. at 2.
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and their appropriate punishments. 60 This means that the way that
baseball’s unwritten rules play out may change wildly from one series to the
next.
The same effects apply in the Senate. An example can be seen in the
now-defunct “no pants” rule for women in the Senate. Politically, this
unwritten rule was enforced by the “audible gasps” of colleagues and the
Senate doorkeepers’ refusal to admit those who didn’t satisfy the dress code.61
Practically, it was a source of confusion, because different doorkeepers
observed different rules, and requests for a written dress code were
rebuffed.62 These effects do not have the same legislative importance—or
constitutional impact—as those surrounding appointments, but they are
typical of the Senate’s unwritten rules.
Politically, the actors who refuse to abide by the unwritten rules of the
judicial appointments process may see their agendas stymied, their political
power diminished, and their efforts at future cooperation rebuffed. 63
Practically, each of the rules addressed has numerous consequences.
Senatorial courtesy, for instance, changes the bargaining strategies of the
various parties involved in the nomination-confirmation process.64 One of
60
61

62
63

64

Id.
See The Evolution of the Pantsuit: A Debate that Continues, One Leg at a Time, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/06/05/the-evolution-of-the-pantsuit-adebate-that-continues-one-leg-at-a-time/53931c05-19ce-4372-b40a-9ee7ec6bf716/
[https://perma.cc/QTB2-UUKX] (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) (discussing how trousers were not
initially “commonplace female attire in the offices of Washington”); Zeigenhorn, supra note 17
(“Though, again, it was not an official or written rule, the Senate employed ‘doorkeepers’ that
decided who did and did not look appropriate to appear.”).
Zeigenhorn, supra note 17.
See,
e.g.,
Informal
Practices
of
Congress,
UNIV.
OF
GRONINGEN,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/government-1991/the-legislative-branch-the-reach-ofcongress/informal-practices-of-congress.php [https://perma.cc/5AKC-78UH] (last visited Oct. 9,
2021) (“Those [Senators] who conform to the[] informal rules are more likely to be appointed to
prestigious committees[,] or at least to committees that affect the interests of a significant portion
of their constituents.”); Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, supra note 12, at 669-70 (“Hostilities break
out in the process for selecting lower court judges . . . . when the President, senators, and/or
nominees violate some long-standing practices or expectations.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory
and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688 (2001) [hereinafter Norm
Theory] (“[P]olitical leaders’ compliance with and manipulation of norms can facilitate the
fulfillment of personal or party agendas on federal appointments.”).
See Sharp, supra note 30, at 775 (“[S]enators from the state housing [a] district court vacancy are
likely to be more familiar than the President with potential nominees . . . . The President potentially
has less interest in spending the political capital needed to overcome an objecting home-state
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Thurmond Rule’s effects is direct—it keeps any judges off the bench until the
election of a new administration. It has also been argued, though, that the
Thurmond Rule’s impact extends past that to judges who are confirmed
under circumstances in which the Rule should seemingly have enforced, and
creates an “aura of illegitimacy” around their tenure.65 The desirability of
the unwritten rules (discussed in Part III) hinges on these political and
practical effects.
A. Political Effects
In a political sense, adherence to the unwritten rules of judicial
appointments is a safer strategy than defection. 66 Adherence can lead to
increased bargaining around judicial appointments 67 and a move toward
consensus nominees, rather than unilateral picks.68 The same adherence,
however, can result in an effective transfer of the nomination power from the
President to the Senate.69 Deviation, on the other hand, is almost always met
with sanctions, sometimes even when it is a member of the party in power

65
66

67
68

69

Senator regarding an individual district court nomination. As a result of the imbalance of interest
in the appointment, senatorial courtesy allows the President to defer the nomination power to the
home-state senators without substantial political sacrifice.”).
Charles W. Collier, The Unwritten Rules of Liberal Democracy, 15 UNIV. MASS. L. REV. 197, 215 (2020).
This depends to some degree on the extent to which a “rule” is recognized. A practice that is not
acknowledged by other actors is unlikely to result in sanctions. As Professor Gerhardt has suggested,
the existence of a “norm” may, in fact, be predicated on its enforcement via sanction. Gerhardt,
Norm Theory, supra note 63, at 1698 (“The difference between a practice that triggers sanctions and
one that does not is the difference between a norm and a practice that is not, or perhaps is no
longer, a norm.”). It is important to note that the political consequences here are those that occur
within the legislative process—not those that are imposed by the electorate. This discussion focuses
on the effects of adherence or deviation on repeat play in the Senate, not on the chances that a
particular senator will be re-elected.
See PALMER, supra note 37, at 9 (observing that according to some analysts the blue-slip process
originated so that senators could be more involved “in the ‘advice phase’ of a nomination.”).
See Geoff Earle, Senators Spar over ‘Thurmond Rule’, THE HILL (July 21, 2004),
http://web.archive.org/web/20040722212816/http://www.hillnews.com/news/072104/thurm
ond.aspx [https://perma.cc/TZ53-TRUJ] (noting that under the Thurmond Rule, “members
don’t rule out action on widely popular nominees . . . .”).
See HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 171–72 (1988) (“Through the custom of
senatorial courtesy, the senators may exercise a virtual veto over the president’s choice. The extent
and nature of this exercise of power varies considerably with the senator . . . [some senators]
jealously fight for this power to virtually dictate the choice of a particular nominee.”).

324

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:1

who deviates.70 Deviation from the unwritten rules can diminish the political
capital of an actor or lead to an escalation of obstructive tactics,71 and often
results in outright failure of the attempted action.72
The failure of executives to acknowledge the tradition of senatorial
courtesy has led to “the most devastating defeats” suffered by presidents in
the appointments process. 73 Analysts have noted that Presidents Grant,
Hoover, and Carter all “immediately set their sights on challenging
senatorial courtesy” and “paid enormous prices, particularly within their
own parties, for their boldness.”74 For Grant, that price came in the form of
a defeated Supreme Court nomination; Hoover’s challenge to senatorial
courtesy cost him control over his party’s domestic policy; Carter’s cost was
frustration and embarrassment in other lower court appointments. 75
Carter’s difficulties in particular came from the ministrations of Ted
Kennedy, the Judiciary Chair and a senator from Carter’s own Democratic
Party.76
The penalties for attempting to buck these customs are not limited to the
executive, either. Following the 2002 midterm elections, Judiciary Chair
Orrin Hatch tried to “dial down” the blue-slip policy and announced an
intention to hold hearings on nominees even where both home-state senators
disapproved of the nominee.77 Nevertheless, the disapproving senators used
other tactics to maintain the status quo, and “[n]one of the nominees lacking
the support of their home-state senators were confirmed . . . .”78
70

71
72
73
74
75
76

77
78

See Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, supra note 12, at 680 (“The first significant failure, which every
president has made, is not to consult with the senator(s) from his party in the state for the judgeship(s)
he is trying to fill. This failure is almost invariably fatal to the nomination’s success, and perhaps
most surprising, triggers sanctions not from senators from the opposition party but from the
President’s own party.”).
See id. at 682 (including “protecting senatorial courtesy” and “payback” in a list of reasons for which
senators might obstruct judicial nominations).
See id. at 680 (“Th[e] failure [to consult with the home-state senator] is almost invariably fatal to
the nomination’s success . . . .”).
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 676. Kennedy would later challenge Carter in the 1980 primary as part of what has been
referred to as a “civil war” within the Democratic party. See JON WARD, CAMELOT’S END:
KENNEDY VS. CARTER AND THE FIGHT THAT BROKE THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2019)
(describing the events of that primary race).
Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 96, 97 (2017).
Id. at 98.
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In 2018 and 2019, multiple judges were sent to the Senate at large despite
unreturned blue-slips under the tenure of Judiciary Chairs Chuck Grassley
and Lindsey Graham.79 In response to one of these advanced nominations,
ranking member Dianne Feinstein suggested that it was likely the flouting of
blue-slip procedure would “com[e] back to bite Republicans when they[]
[were] no longer in power in the Senate.”80 This has indeed become a point
of contention in the new senate, as the Judiciary Chair Dick Durbin has
moved forward with at least one circuit court nominee thus far despite a lack
of support from home-state senators.81 These events portend the possibility
that Republican senators may continue to pay a price in the new Senate in
the form of diminished respect for their own blue-slip objections, especially
if the progressive wing of the Democratic Party has its way.82
79

80
81

82

See Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Statement at Hearing to Consider 3rd Circuit and Other Judicial Nominees
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statementhearing-consider-3rd-circuit-and-other-judicial-nominees [https://perma.cc/79P8-DJNA]
(discussing the advancement of Judge Paul B. Matey despite withheld blue-slips); Jordain Carney,
Trump Court Picks Confirmed Despite No Blue Slip from Schumer, Gillibrand, THE HILL (May 8, 2019,
11:22 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/442689-trump-court-pick-confirmed-despiteno-blue-slip-from-schumer-gillibrand
[https://perma.cc/T2KK-T4U3]
(discussing
the
confirmation of Judge Joseph Bianco); Deanna Paul, ‘Damaging Precedent’: Conservative Federal Judge
Installed Without Consent of Home-state Senators, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/27/dangerous-first-conservative-judgeinstalled-after-vetting-by-only-two-senators/ [https://perma.cc/KZB8-BLLP] (discussing the
installment of Judge Eric Miller); Caroline S. Engelmayer, Senate Panel Approves Judge over Objection by
California
Lawmakers,
L.A.
TIMES
(June
20,
2019,
11:50
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-pol-senate-judge-bress-california-20190620story.html [https://perma.cc/M47P-XKDJ] (discussing the advancement of Judge Daniel Bress).
See Paul, supra note 79.
Marianne LeVine, How Senate Dems Reaped the Benefits from 2 Little-Known GOP Manuevers, POLITICO
(Jan. 26, 2022, 4:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/26/senate-confirmationbiden-judicial-nominees-00001682 [https://perma.cc/24CA-A9KX] (“Durbin . . . mov[ed]
forward on a circuit court nominee who would represent Tennessee and lacked support from both
GOP [Senators] Marsha Blackburn and Bill Hagerty.”) See also Marianne LeVine, The One Biden
Priority Democrats Are Convinced They Can Get Done, POLITICO (June 15, 2021, 4:31 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/15/biden-democrats-judges-494292
[https://perma.cc/8QYG-W87K] (“Like Grassley and Graham, his predecessors at the helm of
the Judiciary panel, [Judiciary Chair Dick] Durbin is keeping blue slips for district court nominees
but scrapping them for circuit court picks who oversee multiple states. Progressives are pushing to
do away with the tradition altogether, but that proposal has yet to gain traction.”).
President Biden’s first judicial nomination in a state represented exclusively by Republican Senators
has set the battleground to test whether the Democrats’ resolve holds on retaliating against the
previous disregard for blue slips. See James Arkin, Tenn. GOP Sens. Criticize White House Over 6th Circ.
Nom, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2021, 1:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1441804/tenn-gop-
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The retaliatory obstruction that accompanies a deviation, as in the Hatch
incident described above, is generally characteristic of the unwritten rules.
Defiance of senatorial courtesy has been cited as a reason for the rise of the
filibuster as a weapon to oppose appointments, 83 and commentors have
observed a general cycle of escalating obstruction in response to deviations
from the unwritten rules. 84 Sometimes, as with the Hatch example, the
obstruction takes the form of using different Senate procedures to reach the
same result that deviation was intended to prevent. Other times, as Senator
Feinstein’s threat alluded, the obstruction takes the form of retaliation-inkind—the continued restriction or expansion of the unwritten rule’s use, now
applied in the opposite direction once power has changed hands.
The exercise of the Thurmond Rule has led to consequences of both
types. First, retaliation-by-obstruction, such as in 1992 when attempts to
block earlier nominations to “preserve the vacancies” for the incoming
President Clinton caused the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to a district
court vacancy to be delayed “apparently in retaliation.”85 In the same year,
the second type of retaliation—retaliation-in-kind—seems to have been
exercised by the Judiciary committee in preventing consideration of dozens

83

84

85

sens-criticize-white-house-over-6th-circ-nom (“Tennessee’s two Republican senators critized
President Joe Biden’s nomination . . . to the Sixth Circuit, saying the administration broke tradition
by not meaningfully consulting with home state senators before announcing a judicial pick.”).
Commentary regarding the nomination has posited that the “[o]pposition . . . would not be likely
to stall [the] nomination” due to Republicans’ earlier treatment of circuit court nominations while
in the majority. Id. One of Tennessee’s senators claimed to have not received a blue slip at all in
the nomination process, leading Chuck Grassley, who as Judiciary Chair began this cycle of
disregarding blue-slip procedure, to refer to Durbin’s move as “a severe change from past
practices.” Rose Wagner, After the Blue Slip Burned with Trump in Office, Biden-Era Republicans Feel Its
Absence, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 12, 2022), https://www.courthousenews.com/after-theblue-slip-burned-with-trump-in-office-biden-era-republicans-feel-its-absence/
[https://perma.cc/SXB5-762Q].
See PALMER, supra note 37, at 12 (“One reason [for the absence of mentions of the word filibuster
in historical analyses of nominations from the early twentieth century] could be that the other
devices in place—the blue slip and senatorial courtesy—allowed Senators to prevent confirmation
by the full Senate when they were concerned about a particular nomination.”).
See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 77, at 118 (“The minority party increasingly seizes on the tools of
obstruction, frustrating the majority. The majority strikes back, through mechanisms like reducing
deference to home-state senators and issuing recess appointments. This, in turn, enrages the
minority, which ramps up obstruction still further.”).
RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra note 52, at 23–24.

February 2022]

UNWRITTEN RULES ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

327

of nominees. 86 This retaliation-in-kind may be evidenced by the general
trend between 1980 and 2016 in which the date of the last Circuit Court
confirmation receded from mid-December to late June of the election year,
and then in 2016 all the way back to January.87 In fact, the invocation of the
Thurmond Rule to obstruct the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the
Court in 2016 was often defended as nothing more than an escalation of this
type in response to the alleged prior obstruction by Democrats.88
B. Practical Effects
Practically speaking, the effect of the unwritten rules of the appointment
process is dictated by the answer to the questions they raise. There are four
questions that can be asked of any unwritten rule, each of which is dispositive
of the rule’s effect. First, does the unwritten rule exist at all, which is to say,
has it really been practiced, or has it just been spoken into existence? Second,
what obligations does the rule create? Third, for what set of appointments
does the rule apply, if it should be honored? Does it apply to local
nominations alone, or should it be adhered to for national offices as well? Is
it limited to judicial nominees, cabinet nominees, or subcabinet nominees?
And fourth, what conditions are prerequisite to the exercise of the unwritten
rule? Must it be raised by a senator from a certain party? Is it only useful in
a constrained timeframe? Must the objection take a certain form?

86

87

88

See id. at 24 (quoting Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who invoked Strom Thurmond’s prior actions
in “shutting down entirely the question of judicial nominees” as justification for the failure to process
nominations).
Id. at 36. The last confirmation in 2004 was on June 24th. Id. The last circuit confirmation in
2008 was also on June 24th. Confirmation of Raymond Ketheridge, P.N. 343, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).
The last circuit confirmation in 2012 was on June 12th. Andrew David Hurwitz, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER. The last circuit confirmation in 2016 was on January 11th. Confirmation of Luis Felipe
Restrepo, P.N. 11, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016). Notably, the 116th Congress confirmed a circuit judge
in December 2020, bucking this trend and confirming a lame-duck nominee for the first time in
over 120 years. Confirmation of Thomas L. Kirsch, II, P.N. 2333, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020); see also Senate
Keeps
Confirming
Trump
Nominees,
HAMODIA
(Nov.
30,
2020),
https://hamodia.com/2020/11/30/senate-keeps-confirming-trump-nominees
[https://perma.cc/T2EG-NSL6] (referencing the unusual choice to reopen confirmations).
See Margaret Sullivan, The Tortured Logic from Right-wing Media About Replacing Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/ginsburgconservative-media-react/2020/09/19/b7a725a2-fa7e-11ea-89e3-4b9efa36dc64_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7UQK-73HD] (referring to the defense that “what goes around comes around”
based on the hypothetical invocation by Democrats of the “Biden Rule”).
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These questions are evident in the debates whenever an unwritten rule is
raised, and it is plain to see that the answer to any of them could decide the
question at hand. If a rule does not exist, it can be dismissed outright; if it
does not need to be honored here, the matter can proceed. If the rule doesn’t
apply to the situation, or hasn’t been raised properly, it need not be enforced.
As such, each of these questions is key—and if the answers are left unwritten,
they may change from one instance to the next.
Senatorial courtesy is subject to three of these four questions each time it
(or the blue-slip process) is debated. While the first question (the rule’s
existence) is usually considered settled due to the long history of the unwritten
rule,89 the answers to the other questions are less clear. The second question
(if the rule should be honored) is characteristic of the rule’s exercise because
“the determination of just how much weight to give a Senator’s opposition
. . . is left largely up to the chair of the [Judiciary] [C]ommittee.”90 Certainly,
the rule is not absolute.91 Thus, while the objecting party generally insists
that the rule should be honored, the governing party may disagree depending
on the political circumstances.92
The third question (the scope of the rule) is the subject to much debate.
While it is largely accepted that courtesy should apply to district court
nominations (if it is honored at all), 93 the exact contours of the rule are
unclear when it comes to circuit courts, Supreme Court justices, or nonjudicial appointments.94

89
90
91
92

93

94

See Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 63, at 1702 (“Senatorial courtesy is an especially durable
norm.”).
PALMER, supra note 37, at 9.
Id. at 7.
See, e.g., Jordain Carney, Senate Battle Heats up over ‘Blue Slips’, Trump Court Picks, THE HILL (Oct. 11,
2017, 1:54 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/354955-senators-battle-over-trumpscourt-nominees [https://perma.cc/K745-HHJX] (summarizing the parties’ “rhetorical shots”
about blue slips in which the Republican majority described blue slips “as simply [a] notification of
how [a senator is] going to vote” while the Democratic minority argued that the majority should
honor “the traditions of the Senate” in enforcing a stricter policy).
See PALMER, supra note 37, at 8 (“[T]he courtesy tradition became so ingrained with judicial
nominations to district courts that Senator [Robert P.] Griffin wrote about the practice in 1969: ‘It
is a fact . . . that judges of the lower federal courts are actually ‘nominated’ by Senators while the
President exercises nothing more than a veto authority.’”).
See Sharp, supra note 300, at 755 (“[T]he role of senatorial courtesy in circuit court nominations is
considerably smaller than the ‘prime’ role senatorial courtesy plays in district court recruitment.”);
Senatorial Courtesy, 1 Op. O.L.C. 88, 90 (2013) (recounting an instance in which a Senator
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Finally, the fourth question (prerequisite conditions) has reared its head
as well. There have been changes over time as to how the tradition must be
invoked,95 and Senators have disagreed as to whether the opposition must
have some substance beyond the traditional “personally obnoxious”
objection.96
Because each of the questions is subject to interpretations that will satisfy
the party seeking to exercise the rule (or to prevent its use), the outcome in
each case has as much to do with power and politics as with “rules” of any
kind. We take the Thurmond Rule as an example. The first question asked
is seemingly the simplest: does this rule exist, despite not being codified? And
yet, despite its simplicity, even this question is subject to different answers at
different times—even from the same individuals.
In 2008, Senator Patrick Leahy, then Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, warned outgoing President George W. Bush that he wanted to
“make progress [on nominations] before time runs out on [the] Presidency
and the Thurmond Rule precludes additional confirmations.”97 In response,
Senator Chuck Grassley accused Democrats of “using the so-called
Thurmond Rule to justify grinding the judicial nomination process to a halt”
and called the rule itself “just plain bunk,” asserting that “the reality is that
the Senate has never stopped confirming judicial nominees during the last
few months of a President’s term.”98 Senator Mitch McConnell was similarly
definitive, saying that “I think it’s clear that there is no Thurmond Rule. And
I think the facts demonstrate that.”99

95

96
97
98
99

expressed uncertainty about the application of senatorial courtesy to appointments by the
Postmaster General); Allison Stevens, Trump Has Appointed Judges at a Breakneck Speed. More Are
Coming., NC POLICY WATCH (Jan. 6, 2020), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2020/01/06/trumphas-appointed-judges-at-a-breakneck-speed-more-are-coming/ [https://perma.cc/P7MXCVR3] (referencing an attempt to block a Ninth Circuit appointment via senatorial courtesy).
While “[h]istorically, a Senator has stood on the floor of the chamber and said that the nomination
was ‘personally obnoxious[,]” modern objections are “made before the nomination ever [makes] it
to the floor for a vote” and may occur in a hearing or behind closed doors. See PALMER, supra note
37, at 7–8.
See id. at 7 (“There has been disagreement within the Senate about whether or not a Senator needs
to state the grounds for an objection.”).
Letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., to George W. Bush, President
of the United States (Mar. 20, 2008).
Chuck Grassley, Judicial Confirmation Process, C-SPAN.ORG (July 14, 2008) https://www.cspan.org/video/?206379-1/judicial-confirmation-process&start=1832.
Mitch McConnell, Judicial Confirmation Process, C-SPAN.ORG (July 14, 2008) https://www.cspan.org/video/?206379-1/judicial-confirmation-process&start=1832.
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In 2016, the roles were reversed. Senator Grassley, now the Judiciary
Chair, declared that “[t]he fact of the matter is that it's been standard
practice over the last 80 years [not to] confirm Supreme Court nominees
during a presidential election year.”100 Senator McConnell also pushed for
(and received) a halt to confirmations nearly nine months before the election,
stating that “[the Supreme Court] vacancy should not be filled until we have
a new president.”101 McConnell then abandoned this position in 2020 after
the passing of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, arguing instead that this
Supreme Court vacancy should be filled, so that the electorate could consider
the Senate’s decision to fill it when voting in the upcoming election.102 There
are further examples of inconsistency in the Rule’s application,103 but even
without being exhaustive the point is clear: with unwritten rules like these,
even the existence of the rule may be a matter for debate. At the risk of
stating the obvious, rules that do not exist have little ground for enforcement,
making this question a dispositive one.
The question of whether the rule should be honored is often tied up in
the question of whether it exists—most actors who don’t believe the
100

101

102

103

Lydia Wheeler, Judiciary Chair: ‘Standard Practice’ to Not Confirm SCOTUS Nominee in Election Year, THE
HILL (Feb. 13, 2016, 7:39 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/269398-senatejudiciary-chair-wait-until-election-is-over-to-fill-scalias [https://perma.cc/622W-E232].
Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement Under
Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 9:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitchmcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248#ixzz40L39Q7rJ
[https://perma.cc/HPX5-Q454].
Morgan Watkins, Mitch McConnell: Confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett a ‘Capstone’ to Judiciary Work,
LOUISVILLE COURIER JOURNAL (Oct. 27, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/politics/mitch-mcconnell/2020/10/27/mitch-mcconnell-amy-coneybarrett-capstone-his-judiciary-work/3746900001/ [https://perma.cc/NEN3-CZX5]. Following
this paradoxical logic, McConnell held confirmation proceedings, and the vacancy was filled eight
days before the 2020 General Election. Confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett, PN2252, 116th Cong. (Oct.
26, 2020). McConnell has since signaled that he intends to wield the Thurmond Rule once again
if a vacancy should arise under a Republican-controlled Senate in the second half of President
Biden’s term. See Interview by Hugh Hewitt with Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, (June
14, 2021) (reporting McConnell’s thoughts on Supreme Court confirmations). McConnell tied this
to a claim that “in the middle of a presidential election, if you have a Senate of the opposite party
of the president, you have to go back to the 1880s to find the last time a vacancy was filled.” See id.
As discussed below, this assertion relies on a selective interpretation of what qualifies as the “middle”
of an election; Justice Kennedy was confirmed in February of 1988. See infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
E.g., What Republicans Said About Supreme Court Nominations During George W. Bush’s Last Year, HISTORY
NEWS NETWORK, Geo. Wash. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/162033
[https://perma.cc/64DV-2VBA] (highlighting republican senators’ comments on the Thurmond
rule).
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Thurmond Rule is a true “rule” don’t believe it should be enforced. Even
among those who acknowledge the rule generally, there has been argument
about whether to honor the rule in particular situations. In the Bush-era
scenario discussed above, Patrick Leahy acknowledged the Rule, and even
wielded it as Judiciary chair. Yet, it was Senator Leahy who opposed the
tactic in 2016, reportedly “whipp[ing] out his own pocket Constitution” to
make an argument in favor of confirmation.104 Here, much of the argument
for or against honoring the rule ties back to whether it was honored in the
past—and those against honoring it often change their mind about whether
that was the case.105
The third question, what the boundaries of the rule are, has also been
subject to varied interpretation. Analysis of the Rule’s prior application
found that while Democratic Party senators tended to “directly apply the
Rule only to controversial picks,” allowing votes on consensus nominees,
Republicans were far less discriminating.106 Additionally, as discussed above,
the question of when the “curtain comes down” on nominations is very much
undecided—while the party invoking the rule generally argues that they are
only adhering to the established date,107 there have been only two instances
in 40 years where the last confirmation prior to the election was at the same
time or later than in the preceding presidential election year.108
Finally, the question of prerequisites is another for which the answers are
unclear. Although, as discussed above, the Rule was originally invoked by
the minority party to preserve vacancies for an incoming president, the Rule’s
2008, 2012, and 2016 invocations were all made by the majority party. The
opposition generally invokes the Rule, but its execution is less fixed. In 1980,

104
105

106
107
108

Schram, supra note 50.
See, e.g., Daniel Victor, What Is the ‘Thurmond Rule’?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016, 7:11 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/what-is-thethurmond-rule/ [https://perma.cc/7LVT-DXYK] (noting that even before his use of the rule in
2016, Sen. Mitch McConnell invoked the rule against circuit court judges in 2012); Andrew
Rosenthal, The Thurmond Rule, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012, 4:13 PM),
https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/the-thurmond-rule/
[https://perma.cc/9DKC-CGMW] (observing that Republican senators justified McConnell’s
2012 invocation on the grounds that “Republicans have been plenty cooperative” and that the Rule
has “always been used”).
Tobias, supra note 26, at 2004.
See Rosenthal, supra note 105 (quoting Sen. John Cornyn’s assertion that “this is about the time.
This is traditionally when the curtain comes down on circuit court judges.”).
See Paul, supra note 80.
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the fact that Thurmond’s party was the minority didn’t preclude the nascent
Rule’s use to preserve certain judicial vacancies.109 And in 1988, Reagannominee Anthony Kennedy (along with several other district and circuit
judges) was confirmed to the Supreme Court by a Democratic Majority
Senate despite the Rule’s recent advent. 110 After Joe Biden was elected
President in November 2020, the Senate majority continued to confirm
existing nominees long into December.111
In those three examples, we see a minority managing to keep vacancies
unfilled for an incoming president of the same party, a majority continuing
to act on vacancies for an outgoing opposition president, and a majority
continuing to fill vacancies on behalf of an outgoing president of the same
party. This demonstrates that there is no consensus regarding the
prerequisites for application of the Thurmond Rule. This set of Thurmond
Rule examples is demonstrative of the general status of unwritten rules for
appointments—that the effect of invoking such a rule is not fixed, and in fact
depends more on the whims of the Senate majority than on any mandatory
power behind the rule.
III. DESIRABILITY
Overall, the unwritten rules here have the effect of inviting political
retaliation, obstruction, and confusion—essentially, unpredictability and
partisan conflict. Some degree of conflict may be a desirable and indeed
intended outcome of the constitutional structure that “pits presidents and
senators against each other.”112 But it is hard to believe that the degree to
which partisanship and unpredictability govern the appointments process
could ever have been the intent. While the Constitution was intended to

109
110
111

112

RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra note 52, at 8.
Tobias, supra note 26, at 2002.
Chris Cioffi, Trump Lost, But the Senate Keeps Confirming His Nominees. Lame-Duck Presidents Usually Don’t
Get
This
Treatment,
ROLL
CALL
(Nov.
30,
2020,
11:00
AM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/11/30/trump-lost-but-the-senate-keeps-confirming-hisnominees [https://perma.cc/KU4P-TTK9]; see also Confirmation of Thomas L. Kirsch, II, supra note
87 (confirming a circuit judicial nominee in December 2020).
Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, supra note 12, at 669. Justice Scalia, for instance, believed that
gridlock is “what the system is designed for” and serves to prevent the concentration of power and
promote “only good legislation.” Ashby Jones, Justice Scalia on Gridlock: It’s ‘What the System Is Designed
For’, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2013, 1:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB-46677
[https://perma.cc/53F3-2YSQ].

February 2022]

UNWRITTEN RULES ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

333

invite conflict so that “ambition [would] be made to counteract ambition,”113
the Thurmond Rule instead “invites partisan manipulation, shifting with the
political winds to suit both parties’ distinct needs.”114 Likewise, the tradition
of senatorial courtesy deviates from the constitutional structure—rather than
undertaking its duty of advice and consent, through senatorial courtesy and
the blue-slip process “the Senate has effectively placed the power of
confirmation assigned to the entire senatorial body in the hands of either of
the two home-state senators.”115 Broadly, not only do the unwritten rules
potentially deviate from constitutional structure, they make it “difficult, if not
impossible, to know why certain things either happened or did not happen in
the legislative process[].”116
Partisanship is one undesirable outcome of the unwritten rulebook. One
concern with blue-slipping and senatorial courtesy “is that the blue slip has
been used . . . to select judges on a political, not professional, basis” and as
such “is a perversion of what the founders intended.”117 Similarly, “[c]hronic
partisanship attends the Thurmond Rule’s deployment, significantly
propelling the splenetic confirmation wars across modern presidential
years.”118 The outcome of these political influences is, as demonstrated in
the examples discussed above, that party power matters far more than
“rules” in these scenarios.
Unpredictability is a key element of these unwritten rules and, perhaps
even more so than partisanship, makes them undesirable. One “principal
problem” parliamentarians have faced in advising the Senate regarding
senatorial courtesy is that “[i]t is a difficult rule to apply because . . . the
precedents on it are conflicting.”119 This is coupled with the concern that in
Senate procedure “there are plenty of precedents to go around in order to
legitimate any particular outcome.” 120 The unwritten rules “apply
differently to different political appointments, and apply with different
intensity and to different degrees, depending on such factors as the relative
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Tobias, supra note 26, at 2001.
Sharp, supra note 30, at 756.
Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 757 (2008) (emphasis added).
SOLLENBERGER, supra note 25, at 3.
Tobias, supra note 26, at 2010.
“Personally Obnoxious”? Senatorial “Courtesy” and Judicial Nominations, supra note 28.
Chafetz, supra note 77, at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND, 152 (Steven & Sons Limited 1949) (1930)).
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numbers of offices to which nominations are made, the tenure and scope of
responsibility of the offices in question, the relative ease of defeating certain
appointments in committee, and the relative robustness and certainty of the
applicable norms.”121
Judiciary Chair Chuck Grassley said about blue slips that “because there
is no hard and fast rule, the best way [he knew] how to proceed [was] to look
to what has been done in the past, and roughly follow the examples of [his]
predecessors.”122 Where the best way to proceed is by “roughly follow[ing]”
precedent, the result of any single objection or withheld blue slip is far from
certain. As one op-ed writer put it, “even Chuck Grassley must worry that a
future Senate Judiciary Committee chairperson might not apply this
informal tradition in his even-handed manner.”123
The Thurmond Rule is subject to the same criticisms, in particular that
each invocation of the rule sets new and potentially conflicting precedent that
can be “routinely manipulated in constitutional debates.” 124 This
unpredictability makes the Rule “far too easy to abandon when faced with
abstract appeals to democracy” and could gradually change the scope of the
executive’s appointment power.125 As with senatorial courtesy, the outcome
of a particular invocation of the Thurmond Rule is not tied to the Rule’s
existence at all.
This problem with the Thurmond Rule has become particularly poignant
in recent years. Regardless of individual opinions about whether the
confirmations were normatively “good” or “bad,” no one could argue that
the installation of Justices Gorsuch and Barrett onto the Supreme Court is
not an incredibly significant shift in the ideological balance of the judiciary.
These confirmations depended on the ambiguity inherent in the unwritten
Thurmond Rule. At minimum, the ambiguity surrounding this rule allowed
for inconsistent justifications for the Senate’s confirmation decisions. In
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Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 63, at 1714.
Wheeler, The “Thurmond Rule” and Other Advice and Consent Myths, supra note 28.
Id.; John Zeller, Letter to the Editor, In U.S., Unwritten Rules Are Meant to be Broken, DES MOINES
REG.
(May
5,
2016,
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https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/readers/2016/05/05/us-unwritten-rulesmeant-broken/83873882/ [https://perma.cc/93QX-PTP8].
Michael J. Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 36, 39 (2017).
Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say
about President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53,
86 (2016).
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2016, Mitch McConnell argued that the American people should vote on a
new president before the confirmation of a new justice, so that their voices
could be heard on the matter.126 In 2020, he argued that the people needed
to have a new justice installed before they voted, so that they could evaluate
the quality of that decision when casting their ballots. 127 Because the
Thurmond Rule exists in the ether, rather than on a sheet of paper, this kind
of pretzel logic (combined with partisan power) can determine the outcome
of a given nomination.
To have so-called “rules” that cannot be predictably employed is
untenable. Senate traditions and a “patrician sense of courtesy” are no
longer the “strong force for stability” that they once were.128 The fact that
partisanship alone seems to govern the outcome of the appointments process
is just icing on the cake. It is clear that something must be done to ensure
that these rules are either given consistent effect or removed from the playing
field altogether.
IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
There are three paths to reform of these unwritten rules through two
different branches of the government. First is the judicial path. While the
judiciary does not often weigh in on the Senate’s rules,129 those rules are
subject to a limited scope of judicial review. 130 The second option is
codification—action by the Senate to turn these unwritten rules into written
rules. Finally, the last option is abrogation—essentially the negative form of
codification, in which the Senate would make the application of an unwritten
rule impermissible, and so end the questions regarding it altogether. Each
option has its benefits and impracticalities, but ultimately it is clear that
126
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128
129

130

Everett & Thrush, supra note 101.
See Watkins, supra note 102 (quoting Mitch McConnell’s assertion that “I wanted to get [then-Judge
Barrett] confirmed as soon as possible, preferably before the election, because I think the American
people are entitled to weigh our decision to move forward with this judge in the election if they
choose to.”).
Roberts, supra note 8, at 2193.
See Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 116, at 716–17 (“Very few of the constitutional
judgments of non-judicial authorities are subject to judicial review. Courts not only uphold an
overwhelming number of non-judicial activities they review, but they also defer to non-judicial
precedents in various forms, such as historical practices, traditions, and customs.”).
See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[I]f Congress should adopt
internal procedures which ‘ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,’ it is clear
that we must provide remedial action.”) (quoting United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892)).
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codification is the most advantageous—and indeed most feasible—avenue to
take.
A. The Judicial Option
The judicial path is the most permanent but also the most inaccessible of
the options available to rectify the problems associated with unwritten rules.
The House and Senate may set their own rules, 131 and it has long been
established that the judiciary only has a narrow scope to examine these rules
once a chamber has determined them.132 The status of a rule as “unwritten”
might complicate a court’s analysis, but it would still not preclude a finding
regarding unconstitutionality.133 If a court—or the Supreme Court, as seems
likely in a case of such import—were to assess the constitutionality of a Senate
rule or analyze its meaning, that interpretation would be entitled to a
powerful protection in stare decisis, while a Senate rule of the type discussed
for Codification or Abrogation could be revoked by a later Senate (albeit with
some difficulty).
Courts are incredibly hesitant to take up the validity of Congressional
rules without “violation of an express constraint in the Constitution or an
individual’s fundamental rights.”134 Even where review is undertaken, the
interpretation of those rules is subject to extreme deference, because
“[w]here . . . a court cannot be confident that its interpretation is correct,
there is too great a chance that it will interpret the Rule differently than
would the Congress itself.” 135 The key question in exploring the judicial
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U.S. CONST. art. I § 5.
See e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1892) (“[Congress] may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained . . . . [But where] [t]he Constitution has prescribed no method of making [a]
determination [] it is therefore within the competency of the house to prescribe any method which
shall be reasonably [effective].”).
See Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, supra note 124, at 36 (“If the Supreme Court were ever to
analyze the constitutionality of a Senate rule or practice, such as the filibuster or deployment of the
nuclear option, the fact that one is a rule and the other is a practice within the Senate would not
bind the Supreme Court’s determination.”).
Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2012).
United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In such an instance, “the
court would effectively be making the Rules—a power that the Rulemaking Clause reserves to each
House alone.” Id. at 1306-07.
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option becomes whether the Thurmond Rule or senatorial courtesy defies an
“express constraint” in the Constitution.
Certainly, it has been argued that senatorial courtesy violates the spirit of
the Appointments Clause. The Appointments Clause “is more than a matter
of etiquette or protocol; it is among the significant structural safeguards of
the constitutional scheme.”136 And the purpose of this Clause—to ensure
that the President is accountable for the appointment of federal officers137—
is undermined if one result of senatorial courtesy is that the “judges of the
lower federal courts are actually ‘nominated’ by Senators while the President
exercises nothing more than a veto authority.”138 However, there is no express
constraint in the Constitution. The language of the Nomination Clause and
Appointment Clause “clearly meant different things to different framers of
the Constitution.”139 It is thus unlikely that a court could find any “express
constraint” in the language that lays out the Senate’s duty of advice and
consent that is specific enough to prohibit senatorial courtesy.
There is also a case to be made that the Thurmond Rule undermines
constitutional intent. Opponents of the rule have argued that “Section 2,
Article 2 does not terminate the Senate’s ‘advice and consent’ function . . .
despite any ‘Thurmond Rule[]’ once it leaves town in July for a month and
a half of party conventions and presidential election year campaigning.”140
Analysis in the context of the Garland-Gorsuch saga suggested that the rule
“implicate[s] a deeper problem of separation of powers” by “refus[ing] to
consider any nominee from a particular President with the express purpose
of transferring his appointment powers to a successor.”141 Again, though, the
problem is whether this runs afoul of an express constraint. Because the exact
effect of ‘advice and consent’ on this distribution of power “has been disputed
almost since the beginning of the Republic,” 142 it is hard to know what
express constraint a court could seize upon to decide the rule’s validity.
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Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (internal quotations marks omitted) (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
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PALMER, supra note 37, at 8 (quoting Robert P. Griffin, The Broad Role, 2 PROSPECTUS 285, 289
(1969)).
Id. at 1.
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Kar & Mazzone, supra note 125, at 91.
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The scholars cited above, in analyzing the Garland nomination, argue
that departure from longstanding tradition “generates a category of
constitutional risk” and that “[l]ongstanding practices can . . . guide
constitutional interpretation, particularly on issues relating to the scope of
power of the elected branches of government.”143 They rely in part on the
Noel Canning case, which explains that “long settled and established practice
is a consideration of great weight” when interpreting “constitutional
provisions regulating the relationship between Congress and the
President.”144 The problem with this constitutional hook is that, as discussed
above, nothing about the Thurmond Rule is “long settled.” The parties
affected by the unwritten rule do not agree on its origins, its name, its
function, or even its existence. This makes the prospect of judicial
intervention vanishingly small.
A further problem facing potential litigation is standing. While federal
courts might be able to consider this type of constitutional question with the
right hook, the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction would still bear the burden
of demonstrating standing to sue.145 Constitutional challenges must establish
an “injury in fact” rather than an abstract or hypothetical harm. 146
Challenges to the appointments process often fail to meet this requirement
when brought by citizens.147 Even challenges to the appointments process
by members of the Senate may fail on this ground where the litigant-senator
lacks an injury in the form of diminished legislative effectiveness.148
143
144
145
146
147
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Kar & Mazzone, supra note 141, at 89–90.
Id.; Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524 (2014) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case,
279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Id. at 560.
See, e.g., Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633-34 (1937) (per curiam) (dismissing a challenge to the
appointment of Justice Black for lack of standing); Cogswell v. U.S. Senate, No. 08-cv-01929-REBMEH, 2009 WL 529243, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2009), aff’d 353 F. App’x 175, 176 (10th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing a generalized grievance against the Senate for the delay in two district court
confirmations).
See McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 270 (D. Idaho), aff’d sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454
U.S. 1025 (1981) (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)) (“The touchstone [to
standing] is whether the legislator’s interest in ‘maintaining the effectiveness of (his) votes’ is
sufficient to confer standing to challenge an action impairing that effectiveness.”). In McClure, the
Idaho District Court stated that “[t]o allow members of Congress to change hats, as it were, to
plead the unconstitutionality of their own acts before this court on the basis of an argument already
debated in the Senate but lost there by vote, would . . . set a dangerous precedent.” Id. at 271. This
suggests that, at the very least, a Senator cannot demonstrate standing to challenge a confirmed
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At least two suits were brought regarding the use of the Thurmond Rule
against the Garland nomination, but those suits (brought by individual
citizens) were both dismissed for lack of standing and neither reached
consideration on the merits.149 A later suit seeking to enjoin the replacement
of Justice Ginsburg (and to install Judge Garland in the vacancy) was also
dismissed for lack of standing because it expressed no “particularized”
injury. 150 It is unclear what type of particularized injury a citizen—or,
indeed, a senator—would have to show to reach the merits in such a case.
Finally, the courts cannot simply decide on the “proper” method of
conduct in the appointments process. The judiciary’s “role to play” in the
determination of Congressional rules is limited to evaluating whether the
rules are “constitutionally infirm” or could be “manipulated beyond
reason.” 151 A federal court will not decide lawsuits that ask it to impose
judicially-formulated rules of conduct on the legislative branch in a
vacuum.152 The result is that if the courts cannot address the Thurmond
Rule or senatorial courtesy through the lens of an “express constraint,” they
are unlikely to address the unwritten rules at all.
B. Codification
Codification of the Thurmond Rule or senatorial courtesy would not
solve problems associated with the substance of the rules, but would rectify
the many issues that derive from their unwritten nature. Codification refers
here specifically to the creation of a new Standing Rule of the Senate, rather
than the more easily achievable (and more easily reversible) introduction of
a committee policy or use of a procedural workaround, either of which might
temporarily accomplish the same goal. Codification of this sort could
concretely answer the four questions discussed above, and remove much of
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nominee, although it is unclear how this would apply to a nominee who did not receive
confirmation proceedings.
Michel v. McConnell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 269, 270 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2016), aff’d 664 F. App’x 10
(D.C. Cir. 2016); Kimberlin v. McConnell, No. GJH-16-1211, 2016 WL 8667769 (D. Md. June 3,
2016), aff’d 671 F. App’x 128 (4th Cir. 2016).
Silas v. Trump, No. CV 20-8674-JFW(AGRx), 2020 WL 6054913, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2020).
Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126, 138–40 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
See United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to
“develop rules of behavior for the Legislative Branch” without a “discernable legal standard or . . .
a congressional policy determination”).
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the unpredictability and partisan capriciousness that accompanies the
unwritten rules.
The codification of Senate rules has been advocated for since the early
days of the republic, when John Adams’ “‘inconsistent and subjective manner
while presiding’” led Thomas Jefferson to call for the Senate’s governance
“by ‘some known system of rules [so] that [the presiding officer] may neither
leave himself free to indulge caprice or passion, nor open to the imputation
of them.’” 153 Former Senate Parliamentarian Floyd Riddick was an
advocate of codification, and noted that he hoped to someday “tak[e] all of
the body of [Senate precedent] and put[] it in the rules.”154
Codification of previously unwritten or informal Senate rules is not
unprecedented. Senate Rule XIX, for example, was added to entrench the
Senate’s policy of respectfulness among its members. Although Jefferson’s
Manual of Parliamentary Practice long implored senators to remain civil
during debate, no formal rule about civility was installed until 1902, when a
provision was added to Rule XIX in the wake of a fistfight between the two
senators from South Carolina.155 Rule XIX’s new provision prohibited any
senator from imputing to another sitting senator “by any form of words”
conduct unbecoming of the office.156 This rule is still on the Senate books,
and has been enforced as recently as 2017.157
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THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE
OF THE UNITED STATES § XVII (1801); see Louis Jacobson, Did Elizabeth Warren Break the Rules? Plus
5
Other
Questions
About
Rule
19,
POLITIFACT
(Feb.
8,
2017),
https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/feb/08/did-elizabeth-warren-break-rules-plus-5-otherques/ [https://perma.cc/HDE3-LZHH] (explaining the history of the rule).
S. Res. 285, 113th Cong. Rule XIX (2013) (enacted).
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Whether or not this outcome is normatively desirable, the rule was procedurally effective.
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The central hurdle to codification is the Senate rulemaking process.
Technically, amendments to the Standing Rules require only a simple
majority.158 Practically, though, a proposed rule would have to reach a vote
in the Senate, which would require a cloture motion. A cloture motion on
rulemaking requires the approval of two-thirds of Senators “present and
voting,” a much more demanding threshold. 159 The bottom line is that
codification would require a substantial coalition within the senate—as many
as 67 senators, depending on attendance. This is not impossible to achieve,
but it means that any proposed Rule would have to be highly agreeable to
both parties. This makes codification difficult, but demonstrates its merits as
well—the process of hammering out a compromise proposal could result in
a clearer and less malleable rule.
In regard to senatorial courtesy, one perspective holds that “[g]reater
standardization in the process, . . . along with procedural changes to bring
senatorial courtesy more in line with constitutional design[,] is both possible
and desirable.”160 This view advocates for codification because reforms from
outside the Senate exhibit a “complete lack of any effective enforcement
mechanism . . . because the [reformer] lacks authority to change procedural
rules of the Senate.”161 Codification could formalize senators’ authority over
district court appointments, resolve the question of circuit courts, and remove
Supreme Court nominations from the ambit of senatorial courtesy
entirely.162
Indeed, codification would allow the Senate to declare that senatorial
courtesy exists, to say whether it is mandatory on the Senate (or whether
blue-slip policy is mandatory on the Judiciary Chair), and to define which
senators may raise the objection on which nominations, and how. This
would answer the four practical questions and—by eliminating a senator’s
ability to deviate from the rule—potentially diminish the political
consequences as well. While there might be partisan opposition to the terms
of the codification, the long-standing nature of the rule decreases the
likelihood of opposition to its formalization in general.
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A similar solution has been proposed for the Thurmond Rule.
Codification of the Thurmond Rule “as a formal chamber stipulation” might
rectify the Rule’s problems by laying out “relevant parameters that
Democrats and Republicans do not ‘redefine’ over succeeding presidential
election years.” 163 Codification would require a clear definition of the
Thurmond Rule, obvious and undisputed deadlines, and specification of the
particular vacancies to which the Rule applies.164 It seems, however, that
given the consistent back-and-forth regarding the very existence of the
Thurmond Rule, it may be more difficult to find the necessary coalition to
codify the Rule at all, regardless of terms. If the parties cannot agree to the
rule’s existence, it will be impossible to set it down in written form.
C. Abrogation
The third possible solution is abrogation. Abrogation would solve the
problems of unwritten rules by declaring once and for all that the rule cannot
be enforced, and thus imposing a duty on the Senate to act on nominations
in the absence of some other impediment. This solution would eliminate the
practical issues of unwritten rules at the first question, by declaring that the
alleged rule does not exist. Abrogation would mitigate the political
consequences of the unwritten rules by forcing deviation by all senators, in
which case the impetus for sanctions would be totally removed because all
ability to comply has been removed. Abrogation, however, would require a
total renunciation by both parties of the power to exercise these rules, and
given the effect of majority power on the exercise, it is unlikely that a majority
party would be willing to lend abrogation the necessary support.
Abrogation is less likely for senatorial courtesy than for the Thurmond
Rule, because senatorial courtesy is such a longstanding and stable custom.
For the Thurmond Rule, abrogation has been advocated as a solution that
“duly honors constitutional phrasing and respects voters’ choices . . . by
permitting the chief executive to nominate and senators to carefully advise
and consent . . . across the full terms of the President and senators.”165 Even
in proposing this solution, however, the advocates recognize its difficulties.
The central difficulty arises from “a Senate majority [that] will probably
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oppose this initiative,” considering it “a unilateral disarmament” or an
unrealistic, draconian measure.166
It is not just Senate opposition that would make abrogation difficult,
either. The abrogation would be readily skirted and almost impossible to
enforce. While an abrogation would prevent the majority from halting
confirmations on the basis of the time remaining in a president’s term, there
are numerous other avenues available if a party wished to circumvent that
abrogation. The majority could simply draw out the advice and consent
process over the final year to such an extent that the result is a minimal
number of successful appointments. They could simply reject each nominee
upon consideration. Or, assuming that senatorial courtesy remains in some
form, the majority could withhold blue-slips or discover “personally
obnoxious” attributes of the nominees who are considered.
The enforcement of this abrogation would be nigh on impossible. The
majority is unlikely to penalize its own members for adhering to the
abrogated rule. Given the reluctance of courts to adjudicate the rules of the
Senate, much less dictate them, it would be difficult to have a challenge taken
up for judicial review. Even if such a challenge was considered, the courts
might be reluctant to make a ruling that would effectively result in the
confirmation or rejection of an appointee. The sum of these impediments is
that abrogation is not necessarily a realistic solution, even if the political
obstacles could be avoided.
CONCLUSION
This essay has addressed the history, effects, and desirability of unwritten
rules in the appointments process, as well as potential avenues for reform.
Senatorial courtesy and the Thurmond Rule both have the potential for
substantial effect on the Senate’s conduct in advice and consent. Senatorial
courtesy may serve as a cudgel to defeat specific nominations, while
encouraging consultation with home-state senators by the executive. The
Thurmond Rule, when applied, totally prevents confirmation after a certain
stage in an election year.
The unwritten nature of these rules makes them susceptible to significant
political and practical consequences, not unlike those seen with baseball’s
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unwritten rulebook. Politically, deviation from the unwritten rules of judicial
appointments won’t be punished with a pitch to the head, but may be met
either by retaliatory obstruction or retaliation-in-kind once the balance of
power has shifted. Practically, the unwritten rules raise questions of
existence, enforcement, scope, and prerequisite conditions, the answer to any
of which may prevent the exercise of the rule—or prevent the confirmation
of a judge or justice. These effects are undesirable, as they result in
unchecked partisan manipulation and unpredictable enforcement.
In order to remedy the effects of the unwritten rules, the Senate should
look to codification. While a judicial solution would benefit from stare
decisis, it is exceedingly unlikely that any case regarding senatorial courtesy
or the Thurmond Rule would be meaningfully adjudicated by a federal
court. Additionally, while abrogation could resolve the political and practical
issues of unwritten appointments procedures, abrogation itself is impractical
and unlikely to succeed. Codification, on the other hand, would allow the
parties to level the playing field and agree on the terms of the appointments
process. In essence, the ultimate solution to the problem of unwritten rules
is simply to write them.

